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the judgment based upon that order was pending. There
was, therefore, as I read the record, no exercise of discretion but the denial of the right to take testimony until "the
determination of said appeal". The fact that this was said
to be "for the convenience of the parties and in the interests
of justice" does not change the situation because the defendant relied entirely upon the fact that the appeal was pending
as the ground for her demand for a postponement. Under
these circumstances the case falls squarely within the rule
stated in San Francisco Gas &- Elec. Co. v. Superior Court,
155 Cal. 30 [99 Pac. 359, 17 Ann. Cas. 933], and the peremptory writ of mandate should issue.
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[5] ID.-AID TO INDIGENTS-RELEASE OF LIENs.-An increase in the
benefits to indigent recIpients of aid after the right to them has
vested is not a gift within the meaning of article IV, section 31, of
the Constitution; and the release of a lien which facilitates the sale
of property or loans thereon serves the same public purpose of
aiding the indigent aged as a direct grant of money and is justified.
[6] ID.-GRANT OF AID--RELEASE OF LIENs.-Once the board of supervisors has determined, after investigation as required by section 2227 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, that the purpose
of the Old Age Security Act is served by the release of a lien upon
the property of a recipient of aid, such a release becomes a grant
of aid pursuant to section 22 of article IV of the Constitution for
the support of indigent aged, and is, therefore, within the exception in section 31 of said article.
[7] ID.-AID WITHOUT LIEN-POWER OF LEGISLATURE.-The legislature

[So F. No. 164'35.

has the power to grant aid to indigent aged without imposing any
lien upon their property, and whenever it does so it supplements
direct aid with the benefits which attend freedom from such an encumbrance.

In Bank.-October 2, 1940.]

COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, Petitioner, V. GEORGE A. JANSSEN, as Chairman of Board of Supervisors, etc., Respondent.

[8] ID.-PROPERTY AGREEMENTS-CANCELLATION of.-Since the legisla-

ture may extend aid to indigent aged by authorizing the release of
liens previously acquired upon their property, it may for the same
reasons cancel Old Age Security Property Agreements by which
recipients of aid agreed not to transfer their real property without
consent of local boards of supervisors, which does not violate the
United Stutes or California Constitutions as impairing the obligation of contracts.
[9] ID.-CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS-POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS.-Provisions of
the United States and California Constitutions prohibiting the
passage of any law impairing the obligations of contracts do not
prevent the legislature from changing the contractual rights of its
political subdivisions acting in a governmental capacity.

~

[1] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PUBLIC MONEY-GIFTS-OLD AGE SECURITY.

Section 31 of article IV of the California Constitution prohibits
the legislature from making or authorizing a gift of public money
or thing of value to any individual or corporation, but does not
prevent the legislature from granting aid to indigent aged pursuant
to section 22 of said article.
[2] ID.-WELFARE CODE--RELEASE OF LIENs.-Release of a lien by a

county pursuant to section 2227 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code does not constitute a violation of section 31 of article IV of
the Constitution.

[10] ID_-WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE--DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY.-Section 2227 of the Welfare and Institutions Code
(Stats. 1939, chap. 719) is not an unlawful delegation of legislative
authority to the boards of supervisors, for that section was passed
to serve the purpose of the Old Age Security Act which provides
adequate standards for regulating the authority of the boards of
supervisors to grant old age security.

[3] ID.-GIFTS-PuBLIC PURPosEs-TEST.-In determining whether an

appropriation of public funds or property is to be considered a
gift, the primary question is whether the funds are to be used for
the "public" or a "private" purpose; and if they are for a "public
purpose" they are not a gift within the meaning of section 31 of
article IV of the Constitution.

[11] In.-SPECIAL LAWS-CLASSIFICATION.-Section 2227 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code does not violate section 25 of article IV of
the state Constitution prohibiting the legislature from passing any
local or special law authorizing the creation, extension or impairment of liens, for the classification of the indigent aged as a
group based upon a clear distinction between them and other individuals in the state and applies equally to all persons embraced
in this class.

[4] ID. -

LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION.-The determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for legislative discretion, which is not disturbed by the courts so long as it has a
reasonable basis.

3.

•

See 23 Cal. Jur. 563.
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ID.-RELEASE OF LIEN-PAYMENT TO COUNTy-PRESUMPTIONS.-

There can be no constitutional objection to a county's release of
sueh liens upon payment to the county of such amounts as in the
opinion of the board of supervisors equal the net amounts which
would be released in the event the liens were foreclosed, since the
county would receive the fair value of the liens as consideration for
their release, and it must be presumed the board would not abuse
its power.

PROCEEDING in Mandamus to compel the Chairman of
the Board of Supervisors of Alamada County to release liens
and cancel Old Age Security Property Agreements. Writ
granted.
Ralph E. Hoyt, District Attorney of Alameda County, J. F.
Coakley, Chief Assistant District Attorney, Robert H. McCreary, Assistant District Attorney, Lawrence S. Fletcher,
Deputy District Attorney, for Petitioner.
J. H. O'Connor, County Counsel (Los Angeles), and L. K.
Vobayda. and Gerald G. Kelly, Deputy County COUll1lel, as
Amici Curiae, on Behalf of Petitioner.
Landels, Weigel & Crocker for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-By this proceeding in mandamus the petitioner seeks to compel the respondent, as chairman of the
Board of Supervisors of the County of Alameda, to sign
and execute certain releases of liens and to cancel a restrictive agreement with respect to the real properties of the
recipients of financial aid granted under the provisions of
the Old Age Security Act. Respondent has generally demurred.
In 1929 the legislature enacted the Old Age Security Act
(Stats. 1929, chap. 530, p. 914) which provided for financial
assistance to the needy aged who met certain requirements
and whose property did not exceed specified values. In 1935
section 4 of the act was amended (Stats. 1935, p. 1769) to
provide for lien against the real property of a recipient as
security for the aid which he received. In 1937 the legislature amended sections 2224 and 2225 of the WeHare and Institutions Code, into which section 4 of the Old Age Security
Act had been incorporated, to eliminate the provisions for

a
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(2d)
such liens as well as the provisions making the aid a debt of
the recipient to the state and county .
At the same time section 2225 was amended to provide that
"all liens and mortgages heretofore created under the provisions of this chapter are. hereby released and the board of
supervisors of each county is hereby directed and authorized
to execute and record appropriate instruments of release".
In County of Los Angeles v. Jessup, 11 Cal. (2d) 273 [78
Pac. (2d) 1131], this provision was held unconstitutional as
authorizing a gift of "public money or thing of value" in
violation of section 31 of article IV of the Constitution.
Thereupon the legislature in 1939 adopted section 2227 of
the Welfare and Institutions Code (Stats. 1939, chap. 719),
which provides in part: "Any lien created by the recording
of a notice of aid pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 530
of the Statutes of 1929 as amended by Statutes of 1935, page
1769, may be released by the board of supervisors of the
county granting the aid upon payment to the county of the
amount of aid repayment of which is thereby secured or upon
payment to the county of such amount as in the opinion of
the board of supervisors equals the net amount which would
be realized in· the event that said lien was foreclosed, and
any such lien may be subordinated by the board of supervisors of the county granting the aid to the lien of any mortgage or deed of trust given to renew or refinance any mortgage, deed of trust or other encumbrance, the lien or charge
of which had priority over such lien. In any case in which
the board of supervisors determines, after investigation, that
the purposes of this chapter will be served by releasing any
such lien. in whole or in part by subordinating the same to
any encumbrance and determines that the property affected
by such lien is at the time owned by the recipient of aid the
board of supervisors may after approval by the Department
of Social Welfare release such lien in whole or in part or may
subordinate the same to one or more designated encumbrances
executed by the recipient of aid without consideration or for
such consideration as the board shall determine."
At the same time the legislature added to the code section
2226 which provided in part as follows:
"If the recipient of aid under this chapter owns or acquires
real property or any estate or interest therein the board of
supervisors may require him to enter into a written agreement that he will not, during his lifetime, without the con-
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sent of the board of supervisors, transfer or encumber such
property, which agreement shall specifically describe such
property, be acknowledged by the recipient in the same_manner as a grant of real property and be recorded in the office
of the county recorder of each county wherein such real property or some part thereof lies. " and added section 2229 which
gave the county not only a claim against the estate of any
deceased recipient for reimbursement of aid but also" all the
rights of an unsecured creditor against the entire estate of
the recipient". (Stats. 1939, chap. 719.) Legislation which
became effective February 23, 1940 (Stats. 1940, chap. XI,
sec. 5), repealed the provisions for agreements by recipients
of aid not to conveyor encUmber their property, all such
agreements being "hereby cancelled and declared to be hereafter of no force and effect". The boards of supervisors were
directed to "authorize" by resolution, upon application, the
execution and recordation of appropriate instruments of cancellation of any or all of the agreements canceled by this
section.
Pursuant to section 2227, the Board of Supervisors of "
Alameda County adopted a resolution releasing without con- -l
sideration a statutory lien previously acquired on certain
real property of a recipient of aid, which he still owned, when
it found after investigation that the purposes of the Old
Age Security Law would be served by giving the release.
At the same time the board, pursuant to section 5 of chapter
XI of the "1940 Statutes, adopted a resolution canceling and
releasing without consideration an agreement not to conveyor
encumber real property. It likewise adopted a resolution,
pursuant to section 2227 of the Welfare and Institutions Code,
releasing its lien against certain real property" of a recipient
of aid held by a third party upon payment to the county of
an amount which in the opinion of the board equaled the net
amount which woUld be realized in the event the lien were
foreclosed.
"Respondent Geo. A. Janssen, as chairman of the Board of
Supervisors of Alameda County, refuses to sign and execute
the above-described releases and cancellation 'on the grounds
that section 2227 of" the Welfare and Institutions Code violates section 31 of article IV" of the California Constitution
prohibiting the legislature from making or authorizing any
gift of public money or thing of value to any individual, as

•
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well as section 25 of article IV of the Constitution prohibiting the passage of any special or local law authorizing the
creation, extension or impairment of liens, and constitutes
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. He
further contends that chapter XI of Statutes of 1940 violates
the prohibitions in the United States and California Constitutions against the passage of any law impairing the obligation
of contracts.
[1] Section 31 of article IV of the California Constitution
prohibits the legislature from making or authorizing a gift
of public money or thing of value to any individual or corporation. The next clause, however, provides that nothing in
this section shall prevent the legislature from granting aid
pursuant to section 22 of article IV which authorizes the
granting of aid to indigent aged. [2] Therefore the release
of a lien by a county pursuant to section 2227 of the WeHare
Code does not constitute a violation of section 31, article IV:
if (1) it is not a gift of public money or thing of value, or
(2) it is a grant of aid to indigent aged under section 22 of
article IV.
[3] It is well settled that, in determining whether an appropriation of public funds or property is to be considered
a gift, the primary question is whether the funds are to be
used for a "public" or a "private" purpose. If they are
for a "public purpose", they are not a gift within the meaning of section 31 of article IV. (Oounty of San Diego v.
Hammond, 6 Cal. (2d) 709 [59 Pac. (2d) 478] ; Oity of Oakland v. Garrison, 194 Cal. 298 [228 Pac. 433] ; Allied Architects Assn. v. Payne, 192 Cal. 431 [221 Pac. 209, 30 A. L. R.
1029]; Veterans' Welfare Board v. lUZey, 188 Cal. 607 [206
Pac. 631].) The benefit to the state from an expenditure for
a "public purpose" is in the nature of consideration and the
fWlds expended are therefore not a gift even though private
persons are benefited therefrom. (Allied Architects Assn.
v. Payne, supra.)
[4] The determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for legislative discretion ( Veterans' Welfare Board v. Riley, supra; Allied Architects Assn;
v. Payne, supra; Daggett v. Oolgan, 92 Cal. 53 [28 Pac. 51,
27~. St. Rep. 95, 14 L. R. A. 474]), which is not disturbed
by the courts so long as it has a reasonable basis. (Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U. S. 502 [54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940];
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Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 [8 Sup. Ct. 992, 1257,
32 L. Ed. 253].) This court has frequently upheld the expenditure of funds by the state or its subdivisions for the
benefit of individuals as for a "public purpose" and hence
not within section 31 of article IV. (MacMt'llan v. Clarke,
184 Cal. 491 [194 Pac. 1030, 17 A. L. R. 288] [free school
textbooks] ; Veterans' Welfare Board v. Riley, supra [transportation, tuition and living expenses for education of veterans]; Allied Architects Assn. v. Payne, supra [erection of
memorial hall for war veterans] ; City of Oakland v'. Garrison,
supra [street improvements] j Patrick v. Riley, 209 Cal. 350
[287 Pac. 455] [payments for destruction of diseased cattle] j
Sacramento &7 San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Rt'ley, 199 Cal.
668 [251 Pac. 2071 [flood control] ; City of San Francisco v.
Collins, 216 Cal. 187 [13 Pac. (2d) 912] [bond issue for relief of indigent sick and poor]; Housing Authority of Los
Angeles v. Dockweiler, 14 Cal. (2d) 437 [94 Pac. (2d) 794]
[slum clearance] ; City of San Diego v. Hammond, supra [use
of county funds to pay delinquent assessments on overburdened property]; Goodall v. Brite, 11 Cal. App. (2d) 540
[54 Pac. (2d) 510], [free treatment in county hospital only ~
for those unable to pay]. See 9 Cal. Law Rev. 431; 18 Cal.
Law Rev. 697.)
[5] In the present case the legislature seems clearly justified in its belief that the release of liens held against the
property of indigent recipients of aid is for the general public
welfare. A person may be indigent even though he is the
legal owner of real property and an increase in the benefits
to indigent recipients of aid after the right to them has vested
is not a' gift within the meaning of article IV, section 31.
(Home v. Souden, 199 Cal. 508 [250 Pac. 162]; O'Dea v.
Cooke, 176 Cal. 659 [169 Pac. 366].) The release of a lien
which facilitates the sale of property or loans thereon serves
the same public purpose of aiding the indigent aged as a
direct grant of money. It may remove the necessity for ad·
ditional direct aid to the owner. The county could not in
any event enforce the lien until the death of the recipient and
might gain less at that time than it would lose in direct aid to
the recipient during his lifetime. By releasing the lien from
the recipient's property, the county may relieve the public
treasury to the extent that it relieves the recipient.
[6] Once the board of supervisors has determined, after
investigation as required by section 2227 of the Welfare and

\
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Institutions Code, that the purpose of the Old Age Security
Act is served by the release of a lien upon the property of
a recipient of aid, such a release becomes a grant of aid pursuant to section 22 of article IV for the support of indigent
aged and therefore within the exception in section 31 of
article IV. In the absence of a special statute no liability
rests upon an aged person to reimburse the state and county
for aid legitimately obtained and granted (Bremer County
v. Curtis, 54 Iowa 72 [6 N. W. 135] ; Montgomery County v.
Gupton, 139 Mo. 303 [39 S. W. 447, 40 S. W. 1094] ; Peabody
v. Town of Holland, 107 Vt. 237 [178 Atl. 888, 98 A. L. R.
866] ; Chester v. Underhill, 16 N. H. 64; Stow v. Sawyer, 85
Mass. 515 j In re Dufek's Estate, 164 Minn. 55 [204 N. W.
469] ; Spokane Co. v. Arvin, 169 Wash. 349 [13 Pac. (2d)
1089]), and there is no provision in section 22 of article IV
requiring such liability. [7] The legislature thus has the
power to grant aid to indigent aged without imposing any
lien upon their property and whenever it does so it supplements direct aid with the benefits which attend freedom from
such an encumbrance. If instead it imposes a lien upon the
property of recipients of aid which, it subsequently releases
it merely defers the benefits supplementary to direct aid
which it might have conferred at the outset. In either case
the benefits serve the same public purpose of aiding the indigent aged.
The legislation in question differs materially from section
2225 of the WeHare and Institutions Code, held unconstitutional in County of Los Angeles v. Jessup, 11 Cal. (2d) 273
[78 Pac. (2d) 113]]. (12 So. Cal. Law Rev. 310.) Section
2225 authorized the release of statutory liens on property
which had passed from the recipient of aid to an heir or
grantee and on property of recipients of aid not qualified to
receive it. As the section purported to apply to all liens,
and its provisions were not separable, it was held invalid as
a whole, but the court expre,.sly refrained from passing on the
question whether "legislation may constitutionally be framed
looking toward the release of such statutory liens as may exist
under other classes of typical cases alleged in the petition".
The legislation in this case authorizes the release of liens only
if the property is still owned by a qualified recipient of aid
or, ir- the event it has passed to another, if the county re-
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ceives an amount equal to the value which may be realized
upon, foreclosure of the lien.
[8] Since the legislature may e~tend' aid to hidigent aged
by autb.o~izing the release of liens previously acquired upon
iheir property, it may for the same reasons cancel Old, Age
Security' Property Agreements by which recipients of aid
a~eed not to transfer their real property without consent of
loca.l' boards of supervisors. Such cancellations in no way
violate the provisions of the United States a~d California
Constitutions prohibiting the passage of any law impairing
the obligation of contracts. [9] These provisions do not
prevent the legislature from changing the contractual rights
of its political subdivisions acting in a governmental capacity.
(Oounty of Tulare v. Oity of Dinuba, 188 Cal. 664 [206 Pac.
983]; Oityof Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182 [43 Sup.
Ct. 534, 67 L. Ed. 937] ; Oity of Worcester V. Worcester Oonsol. Street Ra~1wayOo., 196 U. S.539 [25 Sup. Ct. 327, 49
L. Ed. 591].) As the county boards of supervisors are acting as agents for the state in dispensing old age relief
(Oounty of Sacramento v. Ohambers,33 Cal. App. 142 [164
Pac. 613]; San Francisco v. Oollins, 216 Cal. 187 [13 Pac.
(2d) 912]), there can be no impairment of contracts upon a .
voluntary relinquishment by the state of any contractual-~
rights it may have acquired. The passing statement in Oounty
otLos Angeles v. Jessup, supra, that the legislation there in
question was "also constitutionally objectionable because of
its impairment of the obligation of contract" was unnecessary
, to the decision of the case, and upon fuller consideration appears to bewithout support in the authorities. It must, therefo~e, be deemed disapproved by our decision herein.
[10] Respondent's contention that section 2227 is an unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the boards of
supervisors is untenable, for that section was passed to serve
the purpose of the Old Age Security Act which provides adequate standards for regulating the authority of the boards of
supervisors to grant old age relief.. An essentially similar
contention was adversely answered in Hecke v. Riley, 209 Cal.
767 [290 Pac. 451].
[11] Nor does such legislation violate section 25 of article
IV prohibiting the legislature from passing any local or special law authorizing the creation, extension or impairment
of liens, for the classification of the indigent aged as a group
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is based upon a clear distinction between them and other individuals in the state, and applies equally to all persons embraced in this class. (See People v. Oentral Pacific R. R. 00.,
105 Cal. 576 [38 Pac. 905] ; Oity oj' Pasadena v. Stimson; 91
Cal. 238 [27 Pac. 604] ; Darcy v. Oity of San Jose, 104 Cal.
642 [38 Pac. 500] ; Ohitwood v. Heeke, 219 Cal. 175 [25·Pac.
(2d) 406].)
[12] Finally, there can be no constitutional objection to
the county's release of its lien upon payment to the county
of such amount as in the opinion of the board of supervisors
equals the net amount which would be realized in the event
the lien were foreclosed, since the county would receive the
fair value of the lien as consideration for its release. It must
be presumed that in carrying out this section a board of
supervisors would not abuse the power conferred upon it of
ascertaining value. (Heeke v. Riley, supra.)
As none of the objections raised by respondent's demurrer
is valid, it is ordered that a peremptory writ of mandate
issue as. prayed.
Shenk, J., Gibson, C. J., York, J., pro tem., Moore, J.,
pro tem., and Carter, J., concurred.

[L. A. No. 17471.

In Bank.-October Il, 1940.]

JOHN B. BECH'fOLD et al., Respondents, v. BISHOP &
COMPANY, INC. (a Corporation), et al., Appellants.
HARRY T. McKINLEY et al., Respondents, v. BISHOP &
COMPANY, INC. ( a Corporation), et al., Appellants.
[1] EVIDENOE-,-WITNESSES-CREDIBILITY AND WEIGHT--DETERMINATION
of.-In this state the credibility of a witness and the weight to
be accorded to his testimony are questions duected to the trial
judge, who under proper circumstances may accept all or such
part of the testimony of any witness as he believes to be true,
or may reject all .or any part which he believes to be untrue.
[2] . NEGLIGENOE-PERSONAL INJURIES-AUTOMOBILES-EVIDENOE-,-WILo
FUL MISOONDuoT.-In actions for damages for pel'sonal injuries
resulting from an automobile collision, although it is evident :fro~
the finding .of, wilful misconduct that the trial court disbelieved

